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Abstract—We study the reliability of power transmission
networks under regional disasters. Initially, we quantify the effect
of large-scale non-targeted disasters and their resulting cascade
effects on power networks. We then model the dependence of data
networks on the power systems and consider network reliability
in this dependent network setting. Our novel approach provides
a promising new direction for modeling and designing networks
to lessen the effects of geographical disasters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power transmission networks are vulnerable to large-scale
natural disasters, such as hurricanes or geomagnetic storms [1],
[7], [13]. The geographical layout of the network affects the
impact of such real-world disasters since they occur in specific
geographic locations. For example, an Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) attack [10] or geomagnetic storm can cause failure of
electric power lines that directly transmit power to a large city,
thereby likely causing significant disruptions to power services.
However, the damage to the power network infrastructure is
not necessarily limited to these initial failures; power networks
are also vulnerable to cascading failures. Cascading failures
occur when an initial failure in the network changes power
flows, which must obey physical law constraints, such that
additional lines overload and fail. This in turn causes the power
flows to change again; this process will continue until some
stability is reached. A well known example of a cascading
failure is the 2003 blackout where a significant area of the
northeastern U.S. lost power [2]. In this paper we consider
two failure models. The first model considers power networks
with respect to a randomly located geographic disaster and
subsequent cascading failures. The second model builds on
the first; we describe a dependency between power and data
networks and consider the connectivity of data networks in this
context. For each model, we present numerical results based
on real-world networks.
II. OVERVIEW OF MODELS AND RELATED WORK
Motivated by the effects of natural disasters and cascading
failures, we initially consider a two-stage failure model for
power networks. The first stage removes power lines that
intersect a randomly located disk (which models a geographi-
cally correlated failure). The second stage then calculates the
cascading failure that occurs due to the removal of the initial
links. By using the tools developed in our previous work [11]
and the cascading failure model presented in [5], we are able
to calculate the effect of this type of failure in power networks.
To the best of our knowledge, [4] is the only other work to
look at the effect of geographically correlated failures on power
networks.
Next, motivated by the effects of power loss on data
networks [9], we consider the survivability of data networks
with respect to power networks. We assume data nodes rely
on the operation of the closest power load nodes in order to
function. We present numerical results that show data network
connectivity is significantly lower when power network de-
pendency is considered; this implies power network effects
have a significant impact on the survivability of real-world
data networks.
Power network resilience has been considered in the past
[3], [6], however so far only [4] has considered the effects of
a targeted geographic failure model. In this work we consider
the effect of non-targeted geographic disasters on the power
network. Some recent work has modeled the interdependence
between data and power networks and demonstrated asymp-
totic percolation results [8]; however they did not consider
power flows or geography in their models. Additionally, [14]
considered a geographic dependence model but did not con-
sider failures which were geographically correlated.
III. ASSESSING POWER NETWORK RELIABILITY
We now consider a geographic failure model for power
networks where a disaster is modeled as a ‘randomly’ located
disk. This can describe the effect of some natural disasters such
as geomagnetic storms [1], [7], [13] or hurricanes, in addition
to collateral (non-targeted) damage from attacks on other
continental networks (e.g. an attack on the communication or
transportation networks). Our goal is to be able to understand
and quantify the effect of large-scale non-targeted disasters
and their resulting cascade effects on the power network. We
first describe the network and failure model and then propose
metrics to be evaluated on a real-world network.
A. Network and Failure Model
We consider a network such that nodes are represented by
points on the plane and links are represented by line segments.
This is the same model used in previous and related work [4],
[11].
The failure model consists of two stages; the first stage is
link failures caused by the random circular disaster and the
next stage is the resulting cascading failures. We first describe
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Fig. 1. The probability that a randomly located disk centered in C intersects only
l3 and l4 is given by the ratio of the area of the shaded region to the area of the large
rounded rectangle.
the initial failures caused by the random circular disk (which
is the same as the failure model presented in [11]). We model
a disaster event in the network as a single randomly located
disk of a radius rb centered within an area of interest C (i.e.
C is a set of points in the plane where the disaster may be
centered). If the randomly located disk intersects some power
lines, we assume those lines are destroyed.
Geometric probability [16] allows us to assign a measure to
sets of disks. This measure is simply defined as the Lebesgue
integral over the set of disk centers. Using this measure and
tools from computational geometry, we can find the probability
a randomly located disk that intersects C also intersects some
set of links. See Fig. 1 for a simple example and Fig. 2 for
an example with respect to the Italian high-voltage electrical
transmission network (HVIET).
After this initial failure, due to power flow constraints,
a cascading failure may occur. We will use the same power
flow and cascading failure model described in [5]. Thus these
geometric probability tools along with the cascading failure
model allow us to analyze the effects of large scale randomly
located disasters on the power network.
We now present our failure model for power flows and
cascading failures in power networks. We use the same models
as found in [4], [5] and even borrow some notation. The details
of the DC power flow and cascading model may be skipped
and the reader may proceed to Section III-B without loss of
continuity.
1) DC Power Flow Model: We now describe the DC
power flow model which is a linearized version of the more
complicated AC power flow model. We use the DC model
because it is more tractable and easier to find solutions for
power flows.
Let βi represent the amount of power injected at node i.
If βi > 0 then node i is a source of power and may represent
a generator where power is injected into the system. If βi < 0
then node i is a sink of power and may represent demand at
this node. We call these type of nodes power demand nodes.
If βi = 0 then power is neither injected or removed at node i
and may represent a power bus. Let N be the set of nodes in
the network.
Fig. 2. Every shaded region above represents a set of disk centers whose radius is ≈ 8
kilometers and only intersects a particular set of power lines should a failure be centered
within that region. The network being represented is the Italian high-voltage electrical
transmission network (HVIET) [14], [15].
Let (i, j) denote the power line from node i to node j
and let E denote the set of all these lines. Let xij denote the
reactance of (i, j) and let uij denote the capacity of (i, j).
A DC power flow can be described by the amount of power
to flow from node i to node j on (i, j), denoted by fij , and
the phase angle at node i, denoted by θi. A DC power flow
must obey the following constraints.
∑
j:(i,j)∈E
fij = βi ∀i ∈ N (1)
θi − θj = xijfij ∀(i, j) (2)
Equation (1) constrains the total power out of a node to
be equal to the amount of power injected at that node (power
conservation). For example, if a node is a generator then the
net power flow out must be the amount of power generated
at that node. Equation (2) is the analogue to Ohm’s law; the
amount of power through a power line is proportional to the
difference in phase angles θi and θj .
It should be noted that the power flow has a feasible solu-
tion as long as
∑
i∈K βi = 0 for every connected component
K in the network (that is, aggregate supply equals aggregate
demand for that component) [5]. Additionally, the values of
the power flows are unique [5].
2) Cascading Failure Model: We now describe the cascad-
ing failure model. Again, this model can be found in [4], [5],
but is presented here for completeness.
Before any failures occur, we assume the network is
connected and that
∑
i∈N βi = 0. In other words, we assume
aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply.
We now describe the cascading failure model in steps.
1) Set f˜ij to be the absolute value of the power flow on (i, j)
before any failure occurs.
2) Consider some subset of power lines to be initially
removed from the network.
3) In order to calculate DC power flows for this modified net-
work, aggregate supply and demand must match in each
component. Hence, we proportionately reduce supply (or
demand) at nodes in each component until this condition
is met. This may model load shedding or a ramping down
of generators.
4) Power flows fij are then calculated for the remaining
network by finding the unique power flows that satisfy
equations 1 and 2.
5) Let f˜ij = α|fij |+ (1− α)f˜ij .
f˜ij represents some ‘moving average’ of flow through the
power line (i, j) and can be thought of as modeling of
some thermal effects. α is a parameter in this moving
average set to a value between 0 and 1. If α is small,
then the line will take more time steps to ‘heat up’; if
α = 1 then the line can be thought of as feeling the
effect of the new flow instantaneously. In this work we
assume α = 0.5.
6) We then remove all lines for which f˜ij > uij . This may
cause an additional change in the power flows (hence the
cascade); we go back to step 3 and the process repeats
until no flow is above capacity.
It should be noted that we were not able to attain the
capacities of power lines for real power networks. Hence,
in order to approximate the capacities on a power network
we calculate the initial power flows on each line and then
set uij proportional to |fij | before any failures occur. This
proportion is called the Factor of Safety (FoS) and relates to
the amount of ‘spare capacity’ on the power lines. In other
words uij = |fij | × FoS before any failures occur. For real
power grids, it is believed that a good approximation for FoS
is 1.2 [4]. Hence, for the majority of this work, we assume
FoS = 1.2.
B. Performance Metrics and Numerical Results
Our goal is to analyze the effect of a randomly located
circular disk failure in conjunction with cascading failures
on power networks. Let the yield be the fraction of demand
satisfied after the disaster and resulting cascade. By calculating
the probabilities of relevant joint link failures using the tools
and equations in [11] and considering the resulting cascading
effects, one can evaluate the expected value as well as the
distribution of the yield to a randomly located disk failure
event.
We now discuss some numerical results based on the
HVIET network1. Fig. 3 shows the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the average yield on the HVIET network
with disaster radius of 50 kilometers. Addressing the effect
of Factor of Safety, Fig. 4 shows how average yield changes
as the factor of safety (FoS) is changed (Factor of Safety
relates to the amount of ‘spare capacity’ on power lines). Note
when FoS = 1, then there is no spare capacity allocated on
the power lines, so when a failure event occurs the resulting
cascading failure brings down most of the network. As FoS
increases, the amount of spare capacity on the power lines
increase, so the average yield increases as well, as one would
1We would like to thank the authors of [14], [15] for sharing their data.
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Yield
CDF of Yield on HVIET network with radius ≈50km, FoS=1.2, and α=0.5, Average Yield = 0.78336
Fig. 3. CDF of the average yield on the HVIET network with disaster radius of
approximately 50 kilometers. We assume that the region of interest is given by the convex
hull of the network. Note that there is a significant probability the yield is 1; this is mainly
caused by disks centered within the region of interest that do not intersect the network.
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Fig. 4. Average yield vs. FoS on the HVIET network with disaster radius of
approximately 50 kilometers. When the FoS = 1, then there is no spare capacity
allocated on the power lines, so when a failure event occurs the resulting cascading
failure brings down most of the network. As FoS increases, the average yield increases
as well, as one would expect. Note when FoS = 2, then the failure event will have a
much smaller effect on the yield.
expect. For example, when FoS = 2 the failure event will not
have much effect on the yield. Addressing the effect of the
radius of the disaster, Fig. 5 shows as the radius of the initial
disaster increases, the average yield in the network decreases.
We now compare the effect of independent random link
failures to the effect of a randomly located circular failure.
We initially calculate the average yield of HVIET to a circular
disaster while the size of the region of interest C varies. The
size of C is varied to change the probability a unit of fiber is
cut. So we can plot average yield versus the probability a unit
of fiber is cut. See Fig. 6 for results.
Next, we calculate average yield assuming independent link
failures such that links fail with the same probability as in
the random disk-cut case. Thus the probability a link fails is
still a function of its length, however links fail independently.
Since the total number of power lines is not small, calculating
average yield by enumerating all possible failures is not
feasible (possible failures are exponential in number of links).
Instead we use a Monte Carlo approach, using 4000 samples
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Fig. 5. Average yield vs. radius (in terms of degrees of latitude/longitude) on the
HVIET network. As the radius of the initial disaster increases, the average yield in the
network decreases.
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independent link failures
geographically correlated failures
Fig. 6. The solid line shows average yield in HVIET versus the probability
a unit (latitude/longitude) of power line is cut by a random disk of radius
approximately 8km. The dashed line shows average yield in HVIET assuming
power lines fail independently such that lines fail with the same probability
as in the random disk case.
for each particular probability of unit link failure sample point.
See Fig. 6 for results.
Notice that average yield under independent failures is less
than in the case of random disk-cuts. This result demonstrates
geographic disasters on power networks have key differences
from independent smaller scale failures (e.g. power line failure
due to brush growth). Perhaps this is because some power
supply nodes and power demand nodes are near each other
and so a random disk may be more likely to effectively remove
both these nodes simultaneously which may reduce the chances
of a large cascading failure (since power loads will remain
balanced). Also note the contrast to the result in [11] for the
NSFNET data network where independent failures on a data
network have less impact than in the case of random disk-cuts;
this highlights a fundamental difference in the survivability
between power and data networks.
C. Possible Extensions
In the context of random geographic failures and power
networks, the following problems are potential extensions for
future work.
Other metrics: Consider other metrics beyond yield such as
the distribution of number of lines destroyed or the distribution
of connected components. These distributions will allow us to
better understand the impact of a random geographical disaster
on the survivability of the power grid.
Computationally efficient algorithms: Development of ef-
ficient algorithms to calculate the yield in general networks
that scale well with network size. Analyzing the running time
of our current algorithms and developing faster methods will
allow us to obtain numerical results on larger and more detailed
real-world power networks.
Extending the probabilistic failure model: Currently, our
model assumes that every power line intersected by a circular
disk is removed from the network. However, power lines within
a disaster region may not always fail (e.g. shielded power lines
near a hurricane may remain operational). So the disaster may
have a probabilistic effect on the lines. It would be interesting
to capture this doubly random effect; we model a disaster as a
randomly located disk that also has a non-deterministic effect
on the intersected power lines.
AC Power Flow Model: A more realistic power flow model
can be considered. Currently, many papers on power networks
assumes a DC power flow model [6] [4]; this type of model is
very simple and ignores certain effects that may occur during
a cascade. The AC power flow model is a more realistic flow
model, though it is harder to solve for the flow equations [12].
We can alter our failure model to incorporate the more realistic
AC power flow model and study the impact of the cascading
model on yield and other performance metrics.
Robust Design: In addition to the above items, we can
study some power network design issues. One goal may be
to increase the average yield in the network under a random
circular disk disaster. To this end, we may consider how to add
additional power lines or increase capacities of certain power
lines in order to increase average yield. For example, we may
consider what Factor of Safety is required to guarantee the
expected yield above a certain threshold.
IV. RELIABILITY OF DEPENDENT NETWORKS
Many systems and networks depend on reliable delivery of
power from the electric grid. For example, power is required
to operate street lights for transportation networks in cities.
Another example are fiber networks; power is needed at
backbone routers and amplifiers (on fiber links) or else those
components will fail. Since cascading power outages can be
widespread, their effect on dependent systems can be devastat-
ing. In particular, due to the widespread nature of blackouts,
continental fiber networks may become disconnected if the
power failure affects a large area that includes the networks
physical components. For example, the blackouts of 2003 had
a significant effect on the connectivity of the Internet [9].
Motivated by the dependencies of many networks and sys-
tems on the power network, we consider the design of robust
infrastructures with respect to cascading power failures caused
by a randomly located geographic disaster. We first describe a
model for the dependence of a network on the power network.
We then present our failure model and compare data network
reliability with and without power network dependency.
Data Node
Power Demand Node
Fig. 7. Part of the backbone of the Italian research network (GARR) [14], [15] is
shown above by solid line segments representing links and circles representing nodes.
The dashed segments represent the Voronoi cells based on the locations of power demand
nodes, shown by crosses above, in the Italian high-voltage electrical transmission network
(HVIET) [14], [15]. Our model assumes that data nodes extract power from the closest
power demand node; when a demand node fails, data nodes located within its Voronoi
cell are assumed to fail as well.
A. Dependence on Power Network
As described above, many networks and systems require
power to operate properly; that is, failure to provide power
to systems can cause failure in those dependent systems.
Although these systems typically have backup power supplies,
backup generators are often unreliable. We assume, as in the
previous section, that the power network is represented by
points and line segments in the plane. Similarly, we assume
the dependent network is also modeled by points and line
segments. A dependent node is likely to draw its power from a
nearby substation. So, we let a dependent node be operational
if the closest (in a Euclidean sense) power demand node is still
delivering power (that is βi < 0 for node i). Thus, based on
the locations of demand nodes in the power network, we can
construct a Voronoi diagram; a dependent node in a particular
Voronoi cell will depend on the operation of the power demand
node corresponding to that cell. See Fig. 7 for an example.
B. Failure Model
We use the same failure model for the power grid presented
in the previous section augmented with data-power network
dependency. This failure model consists of three stages; the
first stage is link failures caused by the random circular
disaster and the next stage is the resulting cascading failures
in the power network. Then, the effects on the dependent
network (based on geographical proximity to supply nodes)
are considered once the cascading failures have occurred.
C. Metrics for Dependent Network Robustness
Our goal is to assess the reliability of networks to failures
in the power grid. In the context of a random geographic
failure on the power grid and the resulting impact on dependent
networks, we propose to consider the following metrics:
• Connectivity - In many networks, especially data net-
works, we are concerned with connectivity; i.e. does
the network remain connected. For example, we would
like for all major U.S. cities to be able to communicate
with each other, therefore it is reasonable to consider
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Fig. 8. The red dashed curve shows ATTR for the Italian research network (GARR)
as a function of the radius (in latitude/longitude coordinates) of a randomly located
circular disaster when no power networks are considered (using tools and models from
[11]). The blue solid curve shows ATTR for the GARR network when the dependency
effects of Italian high-voltage electrical transmission network (HVIET) are considered.
For every radius considered a Monte Carlo approach with 4000 samples was used. We
note that ATTR is significantly lower when power network dependency is considered;
this implies power network effects have a significant impact on the survivability of real-
world data networks.
the connectivity of the continental fiber network. Thus,
we can consider the probability that the dependent
network remains connected after a randomly located
disaster on the power grid.
• ATTR - If a connected network cannot be guaranteed
after a failure or full connectivity is not critically
important, it may be useful to consider the ATTR
metric. This is given by the probability a randomly
chosen pair of nodes in the dependent network remain
connected after a randomly located disaster on the
power grid. In the following, we consider the effect
of random disasters on real-world dependent networks
using this metric.
D. Numerical Results
Using the failure model just described, we present some nu-
merical results based on the Italian research network (GARR)
and the Italian high-voltage electrical transmission network
(HVIET) [14], [15]. Consider Fig. 8. Via a Monte Carlo
simulation, this figure shows how ATTR is significantly
lower when power network dependency is considered; this
implies power network effects have a significant impact on
the survivability of real-world data networks. Fig. 9 shows
a similar result when the connectivity metric is considered
although the difference is not as significant. Perhaps this
is because removing certain power demand nodes from the
network causes the network to be disconnected regardless if a
cascading failure occurs.
E. Possible Extensions
In the context of a random geographic disaster on the power
grid and its effect on dependent networks, one can consider
to study some network design problems. One goal may be to
increase the connectivity or ATTR metric in the dependent
network. To this end, we may consider how to add additional
power lines or increase capacities of certain power lines in
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Fig. 9. The red dashed curve shows the probability the data network remains
connected for the Italian research network (GARR) as a function of the radius (in
latitude/longitude coordinates) of a randomly located circular disaster when no power
networks are considered (using tools and models from [11]). The blue solid curve shows
the probability the data network remains connected for the GARR network when the
dependency effects of Italian high-voltage electrical transmission network (HVIET) are
considered. For every radius considered a Monte Carlo approach with 4000 samples was
used.
order to decrease the effect of cascading failures in the power
grid thereby reducing the effect on dependent networks. For
example, we may consider what Factor of Safety is required to
guarantee the ATTR metric remains above a certain threshold
in the dependent network. Alternatively, we can consider how
to augment the existing dependent network so that it becomes
more robust to cascading power failures. An interesting future
direction would be to study the joint design of the power
grid and dependent network as well as explore the tradeoffs
between strengthening the power network and the dependent
network.
We now discuss a design problem with respect to data
networks. Suppose we wish to strengthen the connection of
the data network of two major American cities under the
context of random power failures caused by an attack. One
problem would be to consider a maximally blackout disjoint
path problem: how to find a pair of data paths with common
source and destination that has the minimum probability of
being affected by a blackout. The solution to this problem
gives the most survivable pair of paths with respect to power
blackouts.
V. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the effects of natural disasters such as ge-
omagnetic storms [13] and cascading failures, in this paper
we considered a two-stage failure model for power networks.
The first stage removes power lines that intersect a randomly
located disk and the second stage calculates the cascading
failure that occurs due to the removal of the initial links. We
used the tools developed for randomly located circular cuts and
a cascading failure model to calculate the effect of this type
of failure in power networks. Then motivated by the effects
of power loss on data networks [9], we considered the surviv-
ability of data networks with respect to power networks. We
assumed data nodes rely on the operation of the closest power
demand nodes to function. Through numerical results, we were
able to show power network effects have a significant impact
on the survivability of real-world data networks. Our novel
approach provides a promising new direction for modeling
and designing networks to lessen the effects of geographical
disasters.
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